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Wireless sensor networks (WSNs), when deployed in harsh environments, can fail prematurely 
due to elevated rates of component failures. To counteract this problem, fault-tolerant 
techniques, such as redundancy, may be used. A redundant design requires a management 
system. Built-in tests (BITs) are one of the most commonly used approaches for managing 
redundancy, but it suffers from issues such as imperfect fault coverage and common-cause 
failures (CCFs). In this work, a BIT based redundancy management system has been designed 
that makes use of a supervisory unit and a modular architecture to address issues with imperfect 
fault coverage and CCFs. The design has been implemented in prototype WSN devices and 
evaluated through reliability analysis, fault injection testing and industrial test deployments. 
The evaluation results have demonstrated the fault-tolerant capabilities of the proposed system 
design. 
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Chapter 1  
1 Introduction 
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have been gaining popularity in industrial and other 
monitoring applications due to their lower costs and an increased mobility, as compared to 
their wired counterparts. Wireless based systems also provide ease of deployment as they 
require little to no cabling, something that can be very expensive in some industrial plants. 
For example, retrofitted cables in nuclear power plants (NPPs) can introduce a cost of 
$2000 per foot over their lifetime [1]. Under the right setting, wireless systems can improve 
health and safety, increase production and help reduce operating costs in industry [2]. 
WSNs have been used in industry to monitor temperature, pressure, liquid levels, 
equipment condition and motor vibrations, as well as ambient radiation levels (in NPPs) 
[3]. Several standards for industrial WSNs have also been developed such as 
WirelessHART, Zigbee and ISA 100.11a [4].  
In a WSN, sensor nodes are autonomous devices that are equipped with sensors to measure 
certain physical or environment variables, as well as wireless transceivers to communicate 
data [5]. In industrial WSNs, devices that collect data are sometimes referred to as field 
devices, whereas devices that extend wireless communication range for data forwarding 
are called router devices [6]. The collected sensor information is transmitted to pre-
specified collection points, called the sink or gateway, for further analysis by the end users. 






Figure 1.1: Topology of a WSN. 
1.1 WSNs in Harsh Environments  
Although WSNs have been used for various industrial monitoring tasks, the performance 
of a WSN system can be compromised if the deployment environment becomes harsh. The 
harsh environment can be characterized by elevated temperatures and/or radiation (in 
nuclear applications) [7] [8]. These harsh environments may result from industrial 
accidents (either natural or man-made) or may be inherent to the location of deployment. 
Harsh environments can lead to increased WSN device component failure rates that can 
potentially cause the entire system to fail prematurely. For example, elevated 
environmental conditions (such as temperature and radiation) can increase the chance of 
electronic component faults [9] [10]. Other issues that may arise include electromagnetic 
interference from machinery [7] and partial blocking of certain communication paths due 
to people and mobile equipment [11].  
WSNs are deployed to accomplish a specific mission over a certain period of time, often 
in remote or hard to access locations. It is imperative that such a system works reliably 
over the entire duration of the mission. For example, a WSN mission could be to monitor 
                
                 
       
      
      
      
     




an accident environment or adverse condition for the duration of the event. Alternatively, 
the mission could be to monitor a plant process during normal operation between two 
consecutive maintenance intervals. It should be noted that in most deployments it may not 
be feasible to replace or repair the WSN devices during the mission time. The failure of a 
WSN based monitoring system can potentially result in an information blackout that can 
negatively affect plant operations, or hinder mitigation activities if the WSN is used to 
monitor adverse plant conditions.   
It is noted that the existing WSN systems deployed in relatively harsh environment 
typically use some kind of environment casing or shielding to protect components, and also 
employ some methodology to achieve system level fault-tolerance. System level fault-
tolerance can be achieved by forming redundant communication paths in the network 
(through strategic or dense node deployment) to automatically route information when 
some nodes fail. In certain applications, however, it might not be feasible to deploy a large 
number of devices to attain system level fault-tolerance, for example, in a NPP, as it’s 
safety instruments may be sensitive to the EMI from the devices [1]. Instead, device level 
fault-tolerance can help enhance the overall WSN system reliability under harsh 
environments and can provide fault-tolerance to a system when system level fault-tolerance 
may not be practical. 
1.2 Redundant WSN Design  
As mentioned, harsh environments can increase the rate of component failures in a WSN 
device. Therefore, it is feasible to make a device fault-tolerant so that it can operate even 
if some of its components may have failed. Fault-tolerant device design is the core 
objective of this work. The effect of a fault-tolerant design can be expressed in terms of 
reliability, which is defined as the probability that a system will be operational during some 
specified mission time. It is noted that reliability is one of the most common ways to 
express a system’s fault-tolerance ability [12]. 
A system’s fault-tolerance can potentially be improved by incorporating redundancy in the 




some components can remain as backups and assume operation only if the primary 
component fails [13].  
In a redundant design, a redundancy management system is tasked with detecting and 
identifying faulty components, as well as reconfiguring the system when a fault is detected. 
Most of the existing redundancy management systems fall into one of the following 
approaches: 1) built-in tests (BITs) or 2) voting logic [14].  
BITs detect and identify faults by completing a series of in-field tests for each individual 
component. These tests could be realized as supplementary hardware or as a software-
based diagnostics algorithm within a component’s existing logic. In WSN devices, both 
hardware and software BITs can be implemented to aid in the detection and recovery from 
faults [15]. When a fault is detected, the faulty component can be isolated. A backup 
component can then assume operation so that a device can continue to function. Figure 1.2 
illustrates a redundancy management system using the BIT approach. In Figure 1.2, the 
redundancy management system consists of the BITs and the isolation mechanism.  
 
Figure 1.2: BIT approach for redundant components. 
The second redundancy management system approach utilizes a voting element to discern 
faulty components from correctly working ones. A replicated set of components operate 
simultaneously and feed their outputs into a voting unit. Through some predetermined 
         
 
         
 
   
   
           




voting criterion (such as majority voting or middle value selection) faulty components can 
then be identified [14]. Figure 1.3 illustrates a redundancy management system using the 
voting logic approach. 
 
Figure 1.3: Voting logic approach for redundant components. 
Each of the two redundancy management approaches comes with their own strengths and 
weaknesses. For instance, the BIT approach can be implemented with as little as two 
replicated components. It operates on a 1-out-of-n basis, meaning that only 1 replicated 
component must be correctly working for the management system to work [14]. The BIT 
approach is more suitable for applications that have limited resources. In contrast, the 
voting logic approach typically requires a minimum of 3 or more replicated components 
and usually operates on a 2-out-of-n basis [14]. Since voting logic requires a higher base 
number of replicated components and has a lower bound on the number of operational 
components to successfully identify faults, this approach favours applications that are 
repairable, i.e., can undergo maintenance during the mission times [16].  
In this work, the BIT approach has been used to manage the redundancy of a fault-tolerant 
WSN design. The BIT approach has been chosen as it usually requires fewer resources, 
which is typically one of the requirements for a WSN system.   
         
 
         
            
         
 
      




1.3 Issues with Built-in Tests 
Although BITs may be better suited for resource constrained WSNs, some of its own 
drawbacks can potentially counteract this approach’s overall reliability improvement. One 
of these drawbacks is imperfect fault coverage. Fault coverage is the ability of a system to 
correctly detect and identify a faulty component [14]. Imperfect fault coverage results if 
certain faults cannot be detected, which can then lead to a complete device failure. For 
example, if an undetected fault has occurred in a redundant system, then that fault will not 
be mitigated by the redundancy management system. It can be assumed that unmitigated 
faults result in a device failure (either directly or indirectly by causing additional faults in 
the system) regardless of whether backup components are available.  
Another issue with the BIT approach (and redundancy management systems in general) is 
the risk of common-cause failures (CCFs) [17]. The elements used in a redundancy 
management system to detect, identify and reconfigure faulty components is also 
susceptible to failures. Failure of an element of the redundancy management system could 
trigger a complete system failure.  
To design a fault-tolerant WSN using the BIT approach, both imperfect fault coverage and 
CCFs impacts must be effectively addressed.  
1.4 Research Objectives, Scope and Methods 
1.4.1 Research Objectives  
The WSN system, proposed in this work, is assumed to be deployed to perform a 
monitoring task during certain critical missions in a harsh environment. Repairing and 
replacing system devices during the mission time is not feasible. Furthermore, the proposed 
system is particularly suitable for applications where the deployment of a large number of 
devices to achieve system level fault-tolerance is not practical. 
The objectives of this research are to: 
• design a fault-tolerant WSN device that uses the BIT-based redundancy 




• implement the redundancy management system in prototype WSN devices. 
• evaluate the fault-tolerant performance of the redundancy management system. 
Specifically, a redundancy management system has been designed that makes use of a 
supervisory unit, fault detection hardware and a modular design to address the problem of 
imperfect fault coverage and CCFs. This design has been realized in prototype WSN 
devices and their performance has been evaluated in an experimental setting.  
1.4.2 Research Scope  
The proposed design considers fault-tolerant WSN devices with component level 
redundancy using the BIT approach. The WSN is assumed to be non-repairable during its 
mission time. The design has been realized in a prototype WSN system that is then 
evaluated based on assumed and estimated reliability model parameters under simulated 
harsh environment conditions. Elevated levels of temperature and radiation have been 
considered during the system evaluation. These elevated levels are assumed to not be 
severe enough to cause immediate device failures (e.g. components melting). Non-
exhaustive fault injection testing has been used to evaluate the performance of the design. 
Note that practical considerations towards WSN implementation, such as energy 
provisioning, power consumption and communication protocols, are only partially 
considered as they are beyond the scope of this work.   
1.4.3 Methods  
This work is divided into four steps: first, redundancy management approaches have been 
investigated to identify potential techniques that can be used to improve fault coverage and 
to reduce the impact of CCFs. Next, a redundancy management system is designed. In the 
third step, this design is implemented in a WSN system. In the final step, the performance 
of the implemented design has been evaluated through reliability analysis, fault injection 




1.5 Organization  
The remainder of this work is organized as follows. Relevant literature on fault-tolerant 
systems, the impact of harsh environments on electronic components and redundancy 
management systems have been reviewed in Chapter 2. Modelling and analysis of 
imperfect fault coverage and CCFs have been discussed in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, the 
redundancy management system design is presented. Chapter 5 has described the 
implementation of a prototype WSN system, and Chapter 6 has presented the evaluation 





Chapter 2  
2 Background & Literature Review 
In this chapter, some background information on fault-tolerant systems and the impact of 
harsh environments on electronic components are discussed. Different approaches for a 
redundancy management system using BITs as well as existing WSNs for harsh 
environments are also reviewed. 
2.1 Fault-Tolerant Systems 
Fault-tolerance is a term used to describe the ability for a system to operate correctly, 
despite the presence of errors or faults [13]. Three core principles govern the various 
approaches for implementing fault-tolerance that can improve system reliability. A variety 
of methods exist to model and analyze a system’s reliability. These methods and models, 
along with some literature on existing redundancy management systems, are discussed 
next.  
2.1.1 Principles and Evaluation Metrics 
Fault-tolerance is built upon three core design principles: redundancy, diversity and 
independence [13]. Each of these design principles can be used in conjunction with each 
other to enhance a system’s reliability. 
As mentioned previously, redundancy is the act of replicating critical components in a 
system, such that some components can remain as backups and assume operation only if 
the primary component fails.  Redundancy is usually implemented for more critical 
components that either have a higher chance of failure or are essential for correct system 
operation. Redundancy can be active or passive [13]. Active redundancy describes when 
the redundant components operate concurrently, enabling immediate substitution of a 
faulty component. In passive redundancy, backup components remain in a standby state 
until needed.  
Diversity in a design holds many similarities with redundancy as it relates to redundant 




assume operation if the primary component fails, however its functionality is derived from 
different underlying mechanisms or construction. For example, powering an electronic 
device with a primary AC power supply and backup DC power supply would be considered 
as diverse. The advantage with using diverse backups occurs when failure modes are 
different between the components. Continuing with the power supply example, if an AC 
supply requires a power-grid connection, whereas a DC supply is powered through an 
external battery pack, then these two components have different failure modes. If the AC 
supply fails due to the loss of the grid connection, the DC supply would not be inherently 
impacted by this failure mode. To contrast this scenario, if the two power supplies depend 
upon a common set of voltage regulators that then becomes damaged, both power supplies 
can be impacted and fail simultaneously (note that failure here is defined as the inability to 
perform the intended operation). This type of failure scenario is often referred to as a CCF 
or a single point of failure.  
Lastly, independence in design refers to the exclusion or separation of components such 
that a failure in one component does not impact the operation of the other components. A 
transformer is a common example of independence in design since certain types of faults 
are not directly translated between the primary and secondary windings.  
As mentioned, reliability can be used to express the ability of a system to tolerate faults 
[12]. For a system with a constant failure rate, 𝜆, the reliability function is described as 
 𝑝(𝑡) = 𝑒−𝜆𝑡, (2.1) 
with 𝑡 being the time and 𝑝(𝑡) being the reliability at a given time. The higher the 
reliability, the greater the chance that a system will be operational at time 𝑡. Another metric 
often associated with a system’s reliability is mean time to failure (MTTF) [18] which is 
the expected time to failure. For a system with a constant failure rate, MTTF is defined as 




When comparing systems of varying complexity, a normalized MTTF timescale can be 








A normalized timescale can be used to compare reliability improvements in a design while 
abstracting away details that relate a system’s specific failure rate [17].  
To evaluate a system’s reliability, a model must first be developed that sufficiently 
represents the failure characteristics of a system. One of the simplest methods of modelling 
reliability is with reliability block diagrams (RBDs) [18]. By identifying the various failure 
modes of a system’s components, component failure rates and the system’s architecture, a 
model that represents the relationship between component failures and a complete system 
failure can be developed. For example, Figure 2.1 illustrates a RBD for a WSN gateway 
device. In this diagram, there are five key components: a radio unit, a processor unit, a 
memory unit, a power management unit, and a network interface unit. The first four 
components have no replication and are therefore represented as a single block. The 
network interface unit, however, has n replicated units and is therefore represented as n 
blocks in parallel.  
 
Figure 2.1: Example of a reliability block diagram for a WSN gateway device. 
Another common method to evaluate a system’s reliability is through the use of a fault tree 
[18]. A fault tree is similar to RBDs, but it is instead a more visual approach to represent a 
system based on its failure modes. To illustrate, a fault tree is shown in Figure 2.2 for a 
three-device WSN along with the WSN topology: a field device connected to a gateway 
device through a router. In Figure 2.2, the system failure condition incorporates the WSN’s 
                                   
               
    
                
       
       
       
                




topology, as any device failure would result in a loss of information from the field device. 
Each device failure is composed of multiple initiating conditions as represented by the 
circles. An OR gate is used to relate the different failure conditions together, indicating that 
any failure condition results in a complete device failure. An AND gate is used to indicate 
that all initiating conditions must occur for that gate to be activated. 
 
Figure 2.2: Fault tree for three WSN devices. 
2.1.2 Impact of Harsh Environments on Electronic Components 
As already stated in Chapter 1, harsh environments can negatively impact the reliability of 
a system by elevating the failure rates of components. Special consideration must be taken 
to accurately reflect an individual component’s failure rate when developing a reliability 
model, since grossly inaccurate failure rates can render a model useless.  
Most component manufacturers provide failure rate data for their various passive and 
active electronic components under an expected operating environment. Since industrial 
applications can have harsh and variable environmental conditions, this standard failure 
rate data alone may not be enough, and the failure rates may need to be estimated. For this 
            
      
                                       
      
                 
            
       
              
       
             
       
            
     
      
      
      
       




estimation, the manufacturer provided failure rates can be scaled by various degradation 
and acceleration factors under these alternate environmental conditions [19].  
As mentioned, many factors contribute to harsh environment. In this work, reliability 
evaluation has been done only under elevated levels of temperatures and ionizing radiation 
that result in total ionizing dose (TID) effects. The most widespread approach to estimating 
the impact of elevated temperatures (below a level of a deterministic failure) on electronic 















Here, 𝐴𝐹 is the acceleration factor, 𝐸𝑎𝑎 is the apparent activation energy, 𝑇1 is the absolute 
temperature of test 1, 𝑇2 is the absolute temperature of test 2, and 𝑘 is Boltzmann’s 
constant. This life-stress model can be used to scale the failure rate of an electronic 
component by the acceleration factor between two different test points. Manufacturers of 
electronic components usually provide a failure rate for their products at a given 
temperature, such as at 55oC. Given this information and the apparent activation energy, 
the acceleration factor for the component can be determined at a new temperature, enabling 
adjusted failure rate estimates.  
Overall, the benefit of the Arrhenius model is two-fold: the first is that the anticipated 
failure rate of a component, and thus the reliability of a system, can be estimated at various 
ambient temperature levels if a full range of manufacturer provided data is unavailable. 
The second is that accelerated tests can be completed on a part at a high temperature for a 
short duration, and then extrapolated to estimate the failure rate at much lower 
temperatures.  
More advanced multi-parameter Arrhenius models have been suggested for use that take 
into account multiple failure mechanisms for each component under study [20]. These 
models can result in more accurate estimates by using different activation energies for each 
failure mechanism. In practice, the use of these multi-parameter models can be challenging 




MIL-HBDK-217 [21] is a military handbook produced to aid in determining accurate 
failure rate data for electronic components. Based on experimental and field data, this 
handbook provides scaling factors (including temperature induced acceleration factors) 
that can be used to adjust a component’s failure rate to a wide variety of environmental 
conditions. MIL-HBDK-217 also provides scaling factor adjustments for military 
environments (such as on naval ships or when airborne). Based on the scaling method 
suggest in this handbook, failure rates are scaled as follows, 
 𝜆′ = 𝜆𝜃, (2.5) 
where 𝜃 is the scaling term and 𝜆′ is the new component failure rate. Equations provided 
in MIL-HBDK-217 can be used to solve for 𝜃 based on the environmental conditions and 
the type of electronic component. Note that if the failure rate for a non-military 
environment is to be estimated using MIL-HBDK-217, the only scaling term would come 
from the temperature acceleration factor, resulting in 
 𝜆′ = 𝜆𝐴𝐹. (2.6) 
Neither MIL-HBDK-217 nor the more modern JEP122 account for the impact of ionizing 
radiation in the failure rates of electronic components. Instead, a second scaling term called 
the radiation degradation factor, Δ𝑘, is required to estimate the negative impact of this harsh 
environmental condition [22]. With the use of Δ𝑘, the failure probability of an electronic 
component can be scaled to estimate the new failure probability after receiving a specified 
TID, 
 𝑝(𝑡)′ = (1 −  Δ𝑘)𝑒
−𝜆𝑡. (2.7) 
Similar to 𝐸𝑎𝑎, the radiation degradation factor is experimentally determined. The work in 
[23] along with the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center radiation test database [24] can 
be used to estimate this degradation factor, thus enabling reliability estimates under varying 
levels of ionizing radiation. 
Both scaling techniques can be combined as follows to provide a more accurate reliability 




 𝑝(𝑡)′ = (1 −  Δ𝑘)𝑒
−𝜆′𝑡, (2.8) 
with 𝑝(𝑡)′ being the approximated component reliability. 
2.1.3 Redundancy Management Systems Using the BIT Approach 
The primary issue with the BIT approach is imperfect fault coverage [14]. Coverage 
describes the probability that a fault will be correctly identified through some protection 
scheme. Perfect fault coverage results in most voting-based systems where a comparison 
between multiple outputs can detect the occurrence of a fault. On the other hand, BITs have 
imperfect fault coverage due to the difficulties that arise when detecting a fault through 
some sort of self-test. Even with high levels of coverage (nearing 99%), a significant 
negative impact on a system’s reliability occurs [14]. Therefore, circumventing this 
imperfect coverage issue is the primary challenge faced with BITs. 
BIT coverage can be improved by enhancing fault detection capabilities. A significant 
portion of the literature has focused on fault detection and identification by using a variety 
of techniques that fall under model-based, signal-based, knowledge-based, and hybrid 
approaches [25] [26]. Although these approaches are powerful in the correct setting, their 
use is relatively limited for detecting embedded systems faults in a WSN device.  
A BIT-based system structure that uses a comparator has been proposed in [27]. In their 
work, comparison logic (similar to voting logic) and BITs are used simultaneously in a 
dual-redundant system. Figure 2.3 illustrates this arrangement. The advantage of the 
comparison logic is that a fail-safe mechanism is introduced that can halt a system’s 
operations under certain output conditions. This fail-safe mechanism, however, does not 






Figure 2.3: Redundancy management with BITs and comparison logic. 
The other major challenge for the BIT approach is the introduction of additional CCF 
mechanisms. If, for example, a switch that is used to select a redundant system’s output 
becomes damaged, then this faulty switch could result in a complete system failure. This 
added risk introduced by the redundancy management system in some cases can reduce a 
system’s reliability rather than improve it [17]. To better understand the relationship 
between a potential reliability improvement from a redundant design, a redundancy-
relevance boundary has been proposed in [17]. Their work emphasizes the importance of 
considering how CCFs can impact a redundant design and has been discussed further in 
Chapter 3.  
2.2 WSNs for Harsh Environments 
There are a variety of target applications for WSN devices in harsh environments, from 
industrial use to disaster relief scenarios. In this section, WSN device-level architectures 
and existing techniques employed in WSNs for harsh environment applications are 
reviewed.   
2.2.1 Device-Level Architecture 
WSN devices consist of several key components, as shown in Figure 2.4. Field devices 
consist of a radio unit, processor unit, memory unit, power management unit, and a sensor 
         
 
         
 
   
   
           
       




interface unit [28] [29]. Routing devices are similar to the field devices, except that the 
sensor interface unit may be excluded. Gateway devices, also referred to as sink nodes, are 
the end destination for data collected by WSN devices. Since gateways accommodate a 
high volume of traffic and must interface externally to a backbone network, these devices 
are usually equipped with additional resources such as Wi-Fi chips, Ethernet ports and local 
server capabilities. Gateways usually require some infrastructure such as line power, 
Internet access or cellular connectivity to support these resources. Typical components of 
a gateway device are shown in Figure 2.5. 
 
Figure 2.4: Typical components of a WSN field device. 
 
Figure 2.5: Typical components of a WSN gateway device. 
          
               
           
                     
           
               
    
          
               
                          
    
                
           




2.2.2 Existing Monitoring Systems in Harsh Environments 
Some work has been done to develop different WSN systems that are more suited for use 
in disaster response scenarios, as summarized in [30]. Seven different system topologies 
have been identified that make use of multiple wireless communication technologies such 
as satellite, wide area networks and personal area networks. The use of multiple wireless 
technologies and wireless channels within a single system can improve information 
availability in a network  [22]. Some other work has proposed the use of multi-radio WSN 
devices [31] to allow for the integration of multiple WSN technologies on one board (such 
as Bluetooth and Zigbee).  
There are some custom-made, robust wireless monitoring systems developed primarily for 
military applications [32], [33]. These systems include casings or shielding to provide 
protection against adverse environmental conditions. The primary objective for these 
monitoring systems is reliable, long-range communication. Therefore, these systems 
transmit information directly to their end devices by using satellite, cellular or other long-
range technologies.  
Other wireless monitoring solutions rely upon the use of advanced materials and simple 
circuits that are less susceptible to failures in harsh environments. In [34], a specialized 
wireless telemetry system has been developed that can withstand temperatures greater than 
350oC. Similarly, a wireless pressure sensing solution for high temperatures has been 
developed in [35] that relies upon a simple circuit design and FM technology.  
A recent work has proposed a wireless monitoring system for NPPs under severe accident 
conditions [23]. Their objective has been to design a radiation-tolerant system using 
commercial off-the-shelf components. The system has used radiation shielding and a 
redundant design that is based on voting logic.  
2.3 Limitations of Existing Work 
In general, existing WSN systems for harsh environments use a combination of protective 
casing for the devices and system level fault-tolerance (such as ensuring redundant 




devices and the harsh environment, reducing the environment’s negative impact on a 
device’s reliability. However, their effectiveness can be limited. For example, elevated 
ambient temperatures and certain types of ionizing radiation can penetrate through 
protective casing. Although, in general, protective casing can reduce the impact of harsh 
environment to a certain degree, the penetrating effect may still result in conditions that are 
higher than the typical operating environment for a WSN device. Applying additional 
protection to a system to mitigate this effect may not be practical. For example, radiation 
shielding can be used to reduce the TID received by a WSN device, but radiation shielding 
can be an expensive and heavy solution. 
The topologies summarized in [22] can enhance system level fault-tolerance by 
incorporating multiple wireless communication technologies into a WSN. For these 
topologies to be effective, the deployment of their nodes must be restricted to either a 
strategic or dense deployment. This restricted deployment may not be achievable in certain 
applications, limiting their applicability.  
Many of the wireless monitoring systems developed for military applications use long-
range communication technologies that can have difficulty in indoor, industrial 
environments. For example, wireless signals may not be able to penetrate through the thick 
concrete walls of a containment building in a NPP.  
The specialized wireless monitoring systems with advanced materials for use in high 
temperature applications rely upon simple RF circuit technology for point-to-point 
communication. These systems may not be suitable for use in harsh environments if the 
sensor information cannot be transmitted directly to a base station. For example, within the 
containment building in a NPP, mesh networking might be the only option to relay 
environmental data wirelessly to a sink device. These types of systems are also not 
developed for environments with high levels of ionizing radiation.  
In [23], device level fault-tolerance has been achieved with a redundant design based on 
the voting logic approach. Their design has focused on radiation-tolerant design in the 




Overall, protective casings and system level fault-tolerance techniques can have a limited 
effectiveness in certain applications and deployments. Device level fault-tolerance by 
incorporating redundancy in a design can be used to improve WSN system reliability. 
Device level fault-tolerance can also be used in addition to protective casing and system 
level fault-tolerance to further improve WSN reliability for certain critical applications, 
such as monitoring an industrial plant during an accident condition. For device level fault-
tolerance from a redundant design to be an effective solution, the issues of imperfect fault 
coverage and CCFs have to be addressed. The remainder of this work details the 




Chapter 3  
3 Modelling Imperfect Fault Coverage 
The design of a redundancy management system for WSN devices begins with the 
development of an appropriate reliability model. In this chapter, imperfect fault coverage 
is first modelled under ideal conditions, in which no CCFs are introduced. An approach to 
improve coverage through the use of a supervisory unit is then presented. Afterwards, a 
more advanced reliability model is developed that includes the impact of both imperfect 
fault coverage and CCFs. Finally, a modularized architecture that could further diminish 
some of the negative aspects of CCFs is discussed.  
3.1 Modelling Imperfect Fault Coverage Without CCFs 
In the development of a model for a redundant system, the following assumptions are: 
• The failure rate 𝜆 is constant in a given operating environment. 
• Redundant components are in an active state. 
• Redundant components are identical, such that 𝜆1 =  𝜆2 = 𝜆𝑛 = 𝜆. 
• Failures are independent and permanent among all components. 
Note that dependant component failures are modelled separately as CCFs in Section 3.2. 
As well, component failure rates could be time-dependant if environmental conditions 
(such as temperature) change. Therefore, the impact of a non-constant failure rates on the 
developed models will be discussed throughout this chapter when relevant.  
Under the previous assumptions, the reliability for a device consisting of a single 
component can be derived from an exponential distribution as detailed in [14],  





If a single device requires two identical components to be functioning at the same time, it 
is not redundant. The corresponding reliability model would simply be the product of 
reliability of the two components,  
 𝑅(𝑡) =  𝑒−𝜆𝑡𝑒−𝜆𝑡 = 𝑒−2𝜆𝑡. (3.2) 
Instead, if a single device consists of two identical components, and only one component 
needed to be operational for the device to work, then the device would be described as 
dual-redundant. The reliability model for such a device relates to the parallel product of the 
reliability of each component [14],  
 𝑅(𝑡) =  1 − (1 −  𝑒−𝜆𝑡)(1 − 𝑒−𝜆𝑡) = 1 − (1 −  𝑒−𝜆𝑡)
2
.  (3.3) 
In general, the reliability for an 𝑛-redundant device is 
 𝑅(𝑛, t) = 1 − (1 −  𝑒−𝜆𝑡)
𝑛
.  (3.4) 
Equation (3.4) assumes perfect fault coverage (or that a fault does not need to be detected 
for the system to continue to operate). As noted in Section 2.1.3, this perfect level of 
coverage is usually not achievable in a BIT based approach. 
The BIT approach operates on a 1-out-of- 𝑛 basis [14], meaning that the system can 
continue to work if at least 1 replicated component is still functional. The reliability for 
such a system is given as 
 𝑅(𝑛, 𝑝(𝑡)) =  ∑ (
𝑛
1
) 𝑝𝑖(1 − 𝑝)𝑛−𝑖𝑛𝑖=1   
(3.5) 
where 𝑅 is the device reliability, and 𝑝 is the component reliability. In contrast, the general 
model for a voting logic system operating on a 2-out-of- 𝑛 basis is  
 𝑅(𝑛, 𝑝(𝑡)) =  ∑ (
𝑛
1
) 𝑝𝑖(1 − 𝑝)𝑛−𝑖𝑛𝑖=2 . 
(3.6) 
One method to express imperfect fault coverage is to separate a component’s failure rate 




 𝜆 = 𝜆𝑐 + 𝜆𝑢𝑐,  (3.7) 
where 𝜆𝑐 is the covered fault failure rate and 𝜆𝑢𝑐 is the uncovered fault failure rate [14]. 
The entire system’s failure rate, 𝜆, can be split into the faults that can be detected, 𝜆𝑐, and 
the faults that cannot be detected, 𝜆𝑢𝑐. Coincidentally, in this work, a covered fault can be 
detected whereas an uncovered fault cannot be detected. An alternate approach to express 
fault coverage is through a component’s coverage ratio, 𝑐 [14]. Following from Equation 
(3.7), the relationship between the covered and uncovered failure rate is 
 𝜆𝑐 = 𝑐𝜆,  (3.8) 
and 
 𝜆𝑢𝑐 = (1 −  𝑐)𝜆.  (3.9) 
Before developing the reliability model for a system with imperfect fault coverage, first 
the reliability impact of 𝜆𝑐 and 𝜆𝑢𝑐 needs to be understood. If, for example, a detectable 
fault (𝜆𝑐) has occurred in one component of a dual-redundant device, that device could 
substitute the correctly operating component for the faulty component. If, instead, an 
undetectable fault (𝜆𝑢𝑐) has occurred in the same device, that fault would go unmitigated 
in the system and the device would enter into a failed state.  
Fault coverage can be incorporated into the reliability model developed in Equation (3.4), 
as detailed in [14], yielding 
 𝑅(𝑛, 𝑝(𝑡), 𝒄) =  ∑ 𝒄𝑻(𝑖, 𝒄) (
𝑛
1
) 𝑝𝑖(1 − 𝑝)𝑛−𝑖𝑛𝑖=1 ,  
(3.10) 
where 𝒄𝑻(𝑖, 𝒄) is the set of products of the 𝑘-subset of the coverage ratio vector, 𝒄, with 
exactly 𝑛 − 𝑖 elements. The coverage ratio vector for an 𝑛-redundant system is 𝒄 =
{𝑐1, … , 𝑐𝑛}. For a triple-redundant system (𝑛 = 3), the 𝒄𝑻 set would be 
 𝒄𝑻(1, 𝒄) = {𝑐1𝑐2, 𝑐1𝑐3, 𝑐2𝑐3} 
𝒄𝑻(2, 𝒄) = {𝑐1, 𝑐2, 𝑐3} 




Each component has been assumed to be identical, 
 𝑐1 = 𝑐2 = 𝑐𝑛 = 𝑐.  (3.11) 
From Equation (3.10) it can be seen that the uncovered faults negatively impact the 
reliability of the system, with a smaller fault coverage leading to a reduction in reliability. 
If 𝑐 = 0 in a dual-redundant system, the model reverts back to Equation (3.2) where a 
failure in either component results in a device failure. If 𝑐 = 1, the system reverts to 
Equation (3.3), a dual-redundant system with perfect coverage. 
To illustrate this, Figure 3.1 depicts the reliability curve for a dual-redundant system under 
imperfect fault coverage conditions. The y-axis represents the reliability, 𝑅, for a dual-
redundant device, and the x-axis represents the time 𝑡 normalized by the MTTF for a single 
component system. Perfect coverage is when 𝑐 = 1, and imperfect coverage is when 0 <
𝑐 < 1. A clear observation from Figure 3.1 is that as the coverage ratio decreases, the 
reliability diminishes. Conversely, improving the coverage ratio would improve the 
system’s reliability.  
 
Figure 3.1: System reliability under imperfect fault coverage.  
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The results in Figure 3.1 can be explored further to better understand the significance of 
imperfect fault coverage on a system. A question that can be raised is whether the use of 
redundancy in a system can be harmful rather than beneficial? To answer this question, a 
redundancy-relevance boundary for a BIT-based system with a varying level of redundancy 
(LR) and imperfect fault coverage has been developed. This boundary is shown in Figure 
3.2. Here, a redundancy level of 0 represents a system with no redundancy, whereas a 
redundancy level of 1 represents a dual-redundant system. 
 
Figure 3.2: Redundancy-relevance boundary for a BIT-based system. 
This boundary shows the minimum coverage level required for a redundant system to 
improve the MTTF relative to a non-redundant system. For a dual-redundant system (with 
LR=1), a coverage ratio greater than 0.5 is required. To contrast, a triple-redundant system 
requires the coverage ratio to be greater than 0.605. Ensuring that the coverage ratio is 
larger than this boundary condition is imperative to successfully improve the reliability in 
a redundant system.  
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Recall the discussion of the comparator block presented in Section 2.1.3. It has been 
identified that the weakness of this supplementary detection system is its inability to 
improve fault coverage. What if instead this comparator block served a dual-purpose, 
capable of detecting a malfunction and providing additional means to identify the fault? If 
this supplementary block is more capable (perhaps able to provide additional information 
to the existing BITs or providing new identification mechanisms), it could improve a 
system’s fault coverage, which in turn, improves the reliability. 
With this idea in mind, the notion of a supervisory unit with the ability to detect such 
malfunctions is proposed. This supervisory unit provides the functionality of a comparator 
block while also contributing to an improved fault coverage. This proposed topology, 
shown in Figure 3.3, still relies upon the BIT approach as its redundancy management 
scheme. The supervisory unit improves fault coverage by providing feedback to the 
existing BIT mechanisms upon the detection of a malfunction. The first step to fault 
identification is, after all, detecting an issue. This information can then help to trigger 
additional tests within each of the replicated component’s BITs to help with fault 
identification. 
 
Figure 3.3: Modified BIT topology to include a supervisory unit. 
To see if such a topology can, in theory, improve reliability, consider the following 
example. Imagine a dual-redundant system where each replicated component computes a 
         
 
         
 
   
   
           
           
    




number based on its input that then sends this value as a signal through a communication 
channel. Before this output value is sent, a BIT re-checks that the computed value is correct. 
Unknown to the BIT, however, is that noise might occasionally interfere with only one of 
the output signals being sent from the two components, which coincidentally changes the 
output value. If an intermediate element (the proposed supervisory unit) has received this 
signal, a mismatch between the two components could be detected when noise interferes 
with the signal. When this situation occurs, this fault information is fed back to each 
component’s BIT. By feeding back the corresponding output signals, a BIT could then 
conclude that the signal received is not the signal intended to be sent. In turn, the 
component with the noisy communication line could be identified and isolated, allowing 
the alternate component to resume operation. 
Quantitively, a supervisory unit can be incorporated into a reliability model to study its 
impact. A new variable denotes the added fault coverage provided by the supervisory unit, 
called the supervisory coverage ratio, 𝑐𝑠. This supervisory coverage ratio provides an 
additive effect with the existing system’s original coverage, 𝑐. For example, if a system 
has a coverage ratio of 𝑐 = 0.5 and the supervisory unit can detect and identify an 
additional 10% of faults, then 𝑐𝑠 = 0.1. The system’s new coverage ratio, 𝑐
′, would then 
be 
 𝑐′ = 𝑐 + 𝑐𝑠.  (3.12) 
A new reliability model can be produced that includes this additive coverage effect, 
 𝑅(𝑛, 𝑝(𝑡), 𝒄′) =  ∑ 𝒄𝑻(𝑖, 𝒄′) (
𝑛
1
) 𝑝𝑖(1 − 𝑝)𝑛−𝑖𝑛𝑖=1 .  
(3.13) 
This model, however, is not yet complete since the supervisory unit (like all components) 
can fail. As well, the supervisory unit can also provide false information. It would therefore 
have a corresponding failure rate, 𝜆𝑠, and a false positive rate,  𝜆𝑓, along with its own 
MTTF, denoted by MTTFs. The replicated components have their MTTF denoted by 
MTTFc. If the supervisory unit is assumed to be fail-safe (it cannot result in a CCF and any 
false positives can be corrected for, such that 𝜆𝑓 = 𝜆𝑠), its failure cannot result in a system 




How can this loss of coverage condition that arises when the supervisory unit suffers from 
a failure be effectively incorporate into a reliability model? In a sense, such behaviour 
dynamically alters a reliability model that can complicate matters.  
A simple approach can be taken to estimate its effects. Consider the following three 
situations: 
1. The supervisory unit cannot fail (or is highly unlikely to fail). 
2. The supervisory unit has a similar failure rate to the replicated components.  
3. The supervisory unit will fail significantly sooner than the replicated components. 
In the first situation, it would be expected that the full fault coverage benefit of the system 
can be obtained. That is, the reliability model would be Equation (3.13).  
In the second situation, at some point the supervisory unit will fail. It would therefore make 
sense that initially a reliability improvement is achieved close to the maximum achievable 
improvement from Equation (3.13). As time progresses, however, the likelihood that the 
supervisory unit has failed increases. The reliability should therefore rest somewhere below 
the upper bound. As time extends out further, the system would perform as if no 
supervisory unit has been added and approach the lower bound in Equation (3.10). 
In the third situation, it would be expected that the supervisory unit provides a marginal 
improvement since its failure should occur rather quickly. The system’s reliability should 
be expected to quickly approach the lower bound in Equation (3.10). 
From these three scenarios, it can be concluded that the proposed system’s reliability 
should be bounded at all times by Equation (3.10) and Equation (3.13). Further, the 
reliability improvement depends upon the supervisory unit’s failure rate, 𝜆𝑠 and the 
replicated component’s, 𝜆. A decay in the reliability improvement is expected as time 
progresses based on some ratio of these two failure rates.  
A reliability model has been developed that satisfies the previous conditions: 
 𝑅(𝑛, 𝑝(𝑡), 𝒄′(𝛼)) =  ∑ 𝒄𝑻(𝑖, 𝒄′)) (
𝑛
1










𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐹𝑠 = 𝑒− 𝛾   
(3.15) 
and 𝑐′ is 
 𝑐′(𝛼) = 𝑐 + 𝛼 𝑐𝑠.  (3.16) 
Note that 𝛾 is the ratio of the two MTTFs. The effect of this decay function on the reliability 
model is shown in Figure 3.4. Note that the model’s reliability satisfies the previously 
described conditions, as it is effectively bounded between Equation (3.10) and Equation 
(3.13).  
 
Figure 3.4: Bounding effect of the coverage decay function.  
Note here that the model developed in Equation (3.14) is merely an estimate to better 
understand the impact of a fail-safe supervisory unit that is subject to failures. As such, a 
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rigours proof is not provided or needed to gather insight towards the value of the 
supervisory unit in a redundant design. Ultimately, for this model to be deemed correct 
(either as conservative or optimistic) additional testing is required. Nevertheless, insight 
towards the desirable traits of the postulated supervisory unit can be extracted.  
The first insight from Figure 3.4 is that if the supervisory unit is fail-safe, then no harm can 
come to the system’s overall reliability. Second is that the failure rate of the supervisory 
unit influences its reliability improvement. Ideally, a failure rate much smaller than the 
component’s rate would yield the greatest improvement. If these two failure rates are 
similar to each other, a smaller yet significant reliability improvement is gained.  
Note that in scenarios with non-constant failure rates (such as when an environment 
changes), it is important to ensure that the supervisory unit’s failure rate is equal to or lower 
than the component’s failure rate. To determine whether this condition is met, failure rates 
can be calculated under a variety of expected environmental conditions using the scaling 
factors presented in Section 2.1.2. 
In summary, an alternate BIT topology has been proposed that uses a supervisory unit to 
improve fault coverage, and ergo, reliability. This reliability improvement hinges on the 
failure rate of the added unit. Both the BITs and the supervisory unit can introduce 
additional failure mechanisms in a system that can negatively impact the reliability. These 
considerations are discussed next. 
3.2 Modelling Imperfect Fault Coverage with CCFs 
The previous model has not considered the impact of any additional CCFs. A more realistic 
reliability model needs to be developed that includes this fact. The objective of such a 
model is to identify the boundary condition in which a system’s reliability is improved 
given the model parameters.    
One conservative approach for modelling CCFs in a redundant design is the 𝛽-factor model 
[36]. The 𝛽-factor is a single parameter approach to modelling the probability of an event 





 𝛽 =  
𝜆𝐶𝐹𝐹
𝜆+ 𝜆𝐶𝐶𝐹 
 . (3.17) 
This 𝛽-factor can be included in the previously derived reliability model for a redundant 
system, 
 
𝑅(𝑛, 𝑝(𝑡), 𝛽, 𝜆) = ( ∑ (
𝑛
1







Equation (3.18) represents the reliability model for an idealized redundant system. For a 
system constructed with the BIT approach, the respective reliability model is 
 
𝑅(𝑛, 𝑝(𝑡), 𝒄, 𝛽, 𝜆) = (∑ 𝒄𝑻(𝑖, 𝒄) (
𝑛
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whereas the voting logic approach would have  
 
𝑅(𝑛, 𝑝(𝑡), 𝛽, 𝜆) = ( ∑ (
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as its reliability model. 
A similar redundancy-relevance boundary to that in Figure 3.2 can be developed to 
compare the effective reliability improvement of these two approaches. This boundary is 





Figure 3.5: Redundancy-relevance boundary for both redundancy approaches. 
As shown in Figure 3.5, there is a maximum value of the 𝛽-factor for each level of 
redundancy after which the reliability, in terms of the MTTF, would decrease rather than 
improve. For a BIT-based triple-redundant system, this value is 0.379. In contrast, for a 
triple-redundant voting logic-based approach, even with 𝛽 = 0 (no CCFs), a MTTF-based 
reliability improvement cannot be achieved. This result illustrates as to why voting logic 
might not be as well suited for certain non-repairable monitoring applications using WSN 
systems. For example, if a voting logic system is non-repairable and is intended to operate 
until failure, it is expected that this system would fail sooner than a non-redundant system. 
The cause of this earlier failure stems from the increased number of components in a 
redundant system that increases the occurrence of component failures within the same time 
interval. Coincidentally, redundant components decrease the mean time between failure 




as an example, this decreased MTBF means that two components are expected to fail within 
the normalized MTTF interval, reducing this system’s MTTF. 
A reliability model can now be produced that incorporates both imperfect fault coverage 
and CCFs for BIT-based systems as follows, 
 
𝑅(𝑛, 𝑝(𝑡), 𝒄, 𝛽, 𝜆) = (∑ 𝒄𝑻(𝑖, 𝑐) (
𝑛
1





 .  
(3.21) 
Based on this model, a more advanced redundancy-relevance boundary can be developed. 
This new boundary is shown in Figure 3.6. Note that the reliability reduction that results 
from imperfect fault coverage and CCFs is additive; a reduction in fault coverage 
necessitates an improvement in the 𝛽-factor, and vice versa.  
 
Figure 3.6: Advanced redundancy-relevance boundary considering imperfect fault 
coverage and CCFs. 
   
   
        
    
 
 
       
   
   
























   
   
 
 
                    
        
                  
          
                   




This boundary can be used as a design tool, enabling quick reliability analysis of a 
redundant system. Given the estimates for a system’s fault coverage, its 𝛽-factor, and the 
level of redundancy, a designer can determine whether a reliability improvement is 
achieved.  
The redundancy-relevance boundary in its current form does not indicate the magnitude of 
the reliability improvement. Once a design is deemed to improve reliability, it is desirable 
to determine the level of improvement.  
In this regard, a reliability-improvement plane for each level of redundancy can be 
produced from Equation (3.21). By normalizing the factor of improvement against a non-
redundant system’s MTTF, the relative improvement can be determined. Figure 3.7 shows 
this relative improvement under different levels of redundancy. 
These individual planes can be used to determine the anticipated reliability improvement 
given the appropriate model parameters. For example, a triple-redundant system’s level of 
redundancy is two. By examining the top right plane in Figure 3.7, it can be seen that the 
maximum MTTF improvement is 1.83 times greater than that of a non-redundant system. 
This improvement is only attained when the coverage is equal to one and the 𝛽-factor is 
equal to zero. 
The proposed supervisory unit now can be integrated with the reliability model produced 
in Equation (3.21). Previously, the supervisory unit has been assumed to be fail-safe; that 
assumption can now be removed. Note, however, that false positives are still assumed to 






Figure 3.7: Reliability-improvement planes for different levels of redundancy. 









Also, to help simplify the final model, the failure rate of the supervisor unit can be defined 
in terms of the replicated component’s failure rate, 
 𝜆𝑠
𝜆
= 𝛾,  (3.23) 













This 𝛽𝑠-factor, along with the fault coverage improvement, can be integrated into Equation 
(3.21) as,  
















which simplifies to 












 .  
(3.26) 
Equation (3.26) helps identify the final design considerations to determine whether the 
inclusion of this supervisory unit is indeed beneficial.  
Both the benefit received from the supervisory coverage ratio, 𝑐𝑠, and the consequence of 
the 𝛽𝑠-factor are dependent upon 𝛾. This dependency indicates that if the failure rate of the 
supervisory unit is sufficiently smaller than the replicated component’s failure rate, the 
inclusion of this unit can be justified. The following case study further elaborates this 
effect.  
Figure 3.8 illustrates the reliability-improvement plane for a dual-redundant system with a 
varying 𝛾 and 𝛽𝑠-factor. In this scenario, 𝑐 = 0.7, 𝑐𝑠 = 0, and 𝛽 = 0 (the effects of 𝑐𝑠 and 
𝛽 have been removed for clarity). Note that when 𝛾 is small, so is the negative impact from 
𝛽𝑠. This result indicates that if the failure rate of the supervisory unit is significantly smaller 
than that of the replicated component’s rate, its potential to harm the redundant system is 






Figure 3.8: Reliability-improvement plane for a supervisory unit system under a 
varying 𝜸 and 𝜷𝒔-factor. 
From the consequence illustrated in Figure 3.8, the final requirement for the supervisory 
unit can be identified. That is, the failure rate of the supervisor, 𝜆𝑠, should be smaller than 
the failure rate of the replicated components, 𝜆. Note that if the failure rates are not 
constant, then the supervisory failure rate should be smaller than the replicated 
component’s failure rate during the entire mission time.  
Altogether, several design requirements have been identified from the previously 
developed models to determine whether the introduction of a supervisory unit can benefit 
a redundant design: 
• A small 𝛾 (𝜆𝑠 < 𝜆) results in a larger fault coverage improvement from 𝑐𝑠. 
• If the supervisory unit is fail-safe, its use can only improve reliability. 




Of course, a reliability improvement would only be plausible if the requirements from the 
redundancy-relevance boundaries are also satisfied.  
3.3 Impact of Modularity on CCFs 
So far, the primary benefit of the proposed supervisor unit has been seen to be a potential 
increase for fault coverage. Issues with CCFs have yet to be addressed. It would be 
beneficial if the negative impact from CCFs could be reduced.  
Suppose that the entire model for a dual-redundant system with a supervisory unit is treated 
as an individual system module and then replicated, as shown in Figure 3.9. What are the 
benefits and drawbacks of such an approach?  
The leading benefit of the modularized, dual-redundant system architecture can potentially 
be the reliability improvement from this second layer of redundancy. The two main 
drawbacks are an increased number of resources used (4 components and 2 supervisory 
units) and risk of CCFs. These aspects are explored next.  
 
Figure 3.9: Modularized dual-redundant system topology. 
         
 
         
 
   
   
     
      
           
    
        
         
 
         
 
   
   
           
    
                




First, the reliability improvement from the modularized system against resources used is 
analyzed. A quadruple-redundant voting system can be produced, as shown in Figure 3.10, 
using the same number resources as in the BIT system. Note that the voting system does 
not suffer from the imperfect fault coverage problem since these types of redundant 
systems can have perfect or near-perfect fault coverage [14]. 
 
Figure 3.10: Quadruple-redundant system using voting logic. 
However, as mentioned earlier in Section 3.1, there is a downside to the voting logic 
approach. The 2-out-of-𝑛 requirement can produce long-term reliability issues due to its 
         
 
         
 
           
         
 
      
    







Figure 3.11 illustrates this by comparing system reliability under varying degrees of 
redundancy. Shown is the reliability for multiple idealized systems, against the reliability 
for a 2-out-of-4 voting logic system. Note that the ideal system is one where the redundancy 
management approach has perfect fault detection and cannot fail (see Equation (3.4)). 
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Figure 3.11: Comparison of reliability for different topologies. 
Although the voting logic system does provide a significant reliability improvement during 
the first half of its ‘usable life’, this improvement rapidly decays to levels lower than a non-
redundant system. Due to this rapid decay, only an 8% improvement in the MTTF is gained. 
Voting logic operating on a 2-out-of-𝑛 basis is, therefore, not inherently suited for 
applications in non-repairable system with a long mission time (relative to the normalizing 
MTTF) if a low level of redundancy is used.  
A reliability model can be produced that represents the proposed BIT-based modularized 
and dual-redundant system as follows, 
 








where 𝑅𝑀 is the redundancy of the modularized system and 𝛽𝑀 corresponds to the CCFs 
by the reconfiguration mechanism shown in Figure 3.9. For convenience, it is assumed that 
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the modularized reconfiguration mechanisms are similar to that within each module, 
meaning that the 𝛽𝑀-factor could be approximated to 
 𝛽𝑀 ≅ 𝛽. (3.28) 
Equation (3.27) can then be re-written as 
 






 .  
(3.29) 
Usually, each time a problem is solved with redundancy, the risk of CCFs counteracts the 
reliability improvement. However, in this instance, the negative impact that results from 
the 𝛽-factor is indeed reduced. 
To illustrate, Figure 3.12 shows two reliability-improvement planes for the proposed 
modularized system under a varying 𝛽-factor and coverage, 𝑐. For clarity, 𝑐𝑠 = 0 and 𝛾 =
1. The top plane is for when 𝛽𝑠 = 0.05, whereas the bottom plane is for when 𝛽𝑠 = 0.15. 
From Figure 3.12, it can be seen that a significant reliability improvement can be achieved 
in the modularized system over the non-modularized system across a wide range of model 
parameters. In both examples in Figure 3.12, the modularized system can have an improved 
reliability with a coverage ratio of 0.6 and a 𝛽-factor of 0.1, whereas the non-modularized 
system cannot. Coincidentally, such a system can improve reliability even with a 
considerably low coverage ratio. The negative impact from the 𝛽𝑠-factor does, however, 
does still contribute to a reliability reduction. 
For a comparison, Figure 3.13 shows the reliability-improvement plane for two systems 
under similar conditions but with 𝛾 = 0.1. This lower 𝛾 value means that the supervisory 
unit’s failure rate is smaller by a factor of 10 than the replicated component’s failure rate. 
It can be observed by comparing the two planes in Figure 3.13 that the negative impact 






Figure 3.12: Reliability-improvement plane for the dual-redundant system versus 





Figure 3.13: Reliability-improvement plane for the dual-redundant system versus 




The analysis of the modularized dual-redundant system shows that a significant reliability 
improvement can be gained under certain model parameters. That is, more variability for 
both 𝛽 and 𝑐 are allowed. When 𝛾 is small, more variability is also allowed for 𝛽𝑠. Thus, 
the modularized approach can help to reduce the negative impact from CCFs.  
3.4 Impact of Diversity in Design on CCFs 
The entire discussion so far has assumed the replicated components are identical, having 
the same failure mechanisms and failure rates. If the replicated components are still 
functionality equivalent but differ in their failure modes, it could be possible to reduce the 
risk of CCFs between the modularized system. Yet, it is still desirable that each of the 
diverse components are as reliable as each other so that no single component performs 
considerably worse. 
Diversity in design is one common technique used to improve the reliability of a redundant 
system [18]. If non-overlapping failure modes exist between all of the redundant elements 
in a design, then it is possible to reduce the 𝛽-factor for a dual-redundant design, as well 
as the 𝛽𝑀-factor for a modularized system. Any reduction in either of these parameters 
would increase reliability. Therefore, implementing diversity in design is a second strategy 
to reduce the impact of CCFs in a redundant design. 
3.5 Summary of Considerations 
The impact of imperfect fault coverage and CCFs have been explored on several different 
redundant device topologies. It has been shown that if the proposed supervisory unit has a 
failure rate similar to or lower than that of the redundant components, it can increase fault 
coverage in a design. Further, it has been also shown that a modularized dual-redundant 
system architecture and diversity in design can be used to alleviate the reliability reduction 
that may be caused by CCFs. These considerations have guided the design for a redundancy 




Chapter 4  
4 Redundancy Management System Design 
With the foundation set for the conditions in which various topologies can improve a 
device’s reliability, the proposed redundancy management system can now be developed. 
This redundancy management system consists of four parts: the device topology, a 
microcontroller-BIT, a supervisory diagnostics algorithm (SDA), and supplementary fault 
detection hardware (FDH). The combination of these four parts yields the complete 
redundancy management system design that has been implemented and evaluated in a 
WSN device. 
4.1 Device Topology 
The first part of the redundancy management system is the device topology. Based on the 
reliability models developed in Chapter 3, a diverse, modularized and dual-redundant 
topology with a supplementary supervisory unit has been selected. This topology is shown 
in Figure 4.1. 
 
Figure 4.1: Proposed redundancy management system topology. 
   
     
    
     
      
           
    
  
   
   
     
    
     
      
  




        
   
     
    
     
      
           
    
  




   
     
    
      
  
        
        
                        
                   
                    
                                        




Two diverse WSN modules have been selected, one at 900MHz (subsequently referred to 
as Module A), and one at 500MHz (subsequently referred to as Module B), each consisting 
of dual-redundant wireless microcontrollers (WMCUs) and a supervisory unit. Within a 
single module, the two selected WMCUs are diverse yet functionality equivalent (as 
described in Section 3.4). Additionally, each component within a module are interfaced 
together via a dual-redundant and diverse communication bus. Each module also uses a 
dual-redundant sensor interface for its input (noted in Figure 4.1). Note that from an 
electrical perspective, there is little difference in the presented system topology and the one 
analyzed in Figure 3.9.  
Each WMCU has its own BIT that is responsible for detecting faults. If a fault is detected, 
that component is deactivated. Also note that each WMCU has its own supplementary fault 
detection hardware. This hardware can help to detect digital bus communication faults, 
improving fault coverage for each component. Electromechanical relays act as switches 
within this fault detection hardware, isolating the faulty components electrically from other 
components. Finally, each supervisory unit has a supervisory diagnostic algorithm (SDA). 
The SDA is responsible for providing feedback to each of the replicated component’s BIT, 
further assisting with faulty component identification.  
4.2 Microcontroller-Based Built-in Test 
The primary mechanisms for fault detection and identification is through software-based 
BITs that directly influence the fault coverage for each WMCU. Software BITs follow the 
traditional techniques to detect and identify faults within MCUs [37] [38] [39]. Examples 
of such techniques include watchdog timers, exception handlers and IO validation. The 
only unique aspect of these BITs is their ability to use feedback from the supervisory unit 
to further assist with fault detection.  
An issue when using feedback from the supervisory unit for fault detection is the chance 
for a false positive that can prematurely deactivate the redundant components. To help 
reduce this issue, several techniques have been implemented by the BITs. First, if 
supervisory feedback has indicated that a fault has occurred within a WMCU, further 




communicating with other WMCUs within the device. Second, each WMCU will attempt 
to confirm that the supervisory unit is not operating erratically by performing a sequence 
of communication tests. If the supervisory unit fails these tests, the WMCUs can operate 
without supervisory feedback. Third, if the supervisory unit passes these tests, each 
WMCU will attempt to communicate with other WMCUs and check whether the 
supervisory unit is also indicating that they have a similar fault. If the supervisory unit is 
indicating that a same fault has just occurred, then the supervisory unit is assumed to have 
failed since near-coincident faults (in which two components fail simultaneously and 
independently) are typically a rare occurrence. If none of these tests indicate a false 
positive, then the supervisory feedback must be assumed to be correct. 
Upon the detection of a fault, a variety of recovery mechanisms can be implemented, 
including repeated computations, memory invalidation and soft/hard resets. Should the 
fault be permanent, then a fail-safe mode is entered to deactivate the corresponding 
WMCU, as discussed later in Chapter 5.  
4.3 Supervisory Diagnostic Algorithm 
The introduction of the supervisory unit can help to improve fault coverage by providing 
additional fault diagnostic capabilities and component feedback. Simply, upon the 
detection of a mismatched output from either of the WMCU’s, the supervisory unit will 
provide additional information, such as the values sent from each component, back to the 
individual BITs. A leading issue with software-based BITs is having sufficient time to 
complete diagnostics to detect a fault since these self-tests must not interfere with normal 
system operation [40]. Therefore, by notifying each BIT that a fault has occurred, the 
WMCU’s operation can be halted to prevent a system malfunction, allowing for more in-
depth testing to diagnose the fault. Once the fault is diagnosed, system operation can 
resume.  
A secondary feature of the supervisory unit is that it provides an interfacing point between 
the two modules. Each WMCU component can fail in a variety of ways that could render 
its main MCU operational, but the radio inoperable (Figure 4.1). By allowing for each 




achieved. This resource sharing is managed by the supervisory unit’s diagnostic algorithm, 
providing a second layer of redundancy into the design. Both features of the supervisory 
diagnostic algorithm have been shown in Figure 4.2. 
 
Figure 4.2: Features of the supervisory diagnostic algorithm. 
Note that the supervisory unit has been designed to be fail-safe wherever possible. If the 
supervisory unit is working correctly, each module’s redundant WMCU will send 
information to the supervisory unit before that information is sent to its respective radio. If 
the supervisory unit suffers from a failure, such as a loss of function, its failure will not 
impact the operation of the WMCUs. Each WMCU can bypass the supervisory unit and 
send information directly to its respective radio. If the supervisor unit suffers from a 
malfunction and provides faulty feedback to each WMCU (i.e. a false alarm), this faulty 
feedback does not necessarily result in a device failure. Each component’s BIT is 
responsible for deciding whether a fault has occurred and uses the supervisory feedback to 
assist with fault detection.  
      
           
    
        
      
          
        
      
        
       
  
        
      




By having a reasonably fail-safe supervisory unit, ideally only a small fraction of 
supervisory unit CCF mechanisms (captured by the 𝛽𝑠-factor) have been introduced into 
the design.  
4.4 Supplementary Fault Detection Hardware 
To further improve the system’s fault coverage, additional fault detection hardware has 
been developed and introduced into the design. This proprietary hardware is embedded 
within each digital communication bus. Upon the detection of a fault, electromechanical 
relays are triggered that isolate each WMCU within the module.  
4.5 Design Summary 
The proposed redundancy management system consists of several parts. The first is the 
chosen topology that follows from the derived reliability model in Chapter 3. It utilizes 
dual-redundancy, diversity and modularization to help improve the reliability. The 
introduction of the supervisory unit aims to help improve fault coverage by providing 
feedback to each component’s BIT. As well, proprietary fault detection hardware also helps 
to improve the level of fault coverage. The modularized design and the use of diversity in 





Chapter 5  
5 WSN Implementation 
In this Chapter, the details of the implemented design are presented. The implementation 
process has been divided into two tasks: implementing the hardware for the prototype WSN 
devices and developing the software for the WSN devices. 
5.1 Hardware Implementation 
For the implementation of the hardware, first a diverse set of WSN device components 
have been selected. Next, key circuit have been simulated using a circuit simulation tool 
and then the printed circuit boards (PCBs) have been designed.  
5.1.1 Diverse Component Selection 
The proposed WSN device consists of two dual-redundant and diverse modules, Module 
A and Module B. Module A operates at 900MHz whereas Module B operates at 500MHz. 
Each of the WMCUs within a module must be functionally equivalent (i.e. have the same 
RF modulation scheme) and have a similar failure rate to each other, as described in Section 
3.4. As well, each supervisory unit must also be functionality equivalent and share a similar 
failure rate. The supervisory units should also have a failure rate similar to or lower than 
that of the WMCUs, as noted in Section 3.1 and Section 3.2. 
Table 5.1 provides an overview of the components selected for each module. Manufacturer 
provided failure rates in failure in time (FIT) are shown in the table, if available. The 
selected components satisfy the diversity requirement for the proposed redundancy 
management system, as they are designed by different companies and use different 
controller technology. Further, the supervisory unit’s failure rates are similar to that of the 
WMCUs. This allows for a reliability improvement to be attained by the supervisory units, 






Table 5.1: Diverse component selection. 
Module 
Component 
Controller Compatibility Failure Rate 
(FIT) 






















CAN 2.0B 1.22 (90%CL, 
55oC) 
























CAN 2.0B Not Available 
As mentioned in Section 3.4, diversity can improve reliability if non-overlapping failure 
modes exist between the replicated components. In the proposed design, diversity has been 
achieved on two fronts. First, two different wireless communication frequency bands have 
been selected at 900MHz and 500MHz. The advantage of choosing two different bands is 
the resilience to partial channel blocking (perhaps due to interference in the 900MHz ISM 
band or due to obstructions). Lower communication frequencies tend to have an improved 
communication range, potentially allowing the 500MHz radios to maintain a 
communication link if the 900MHz radios should fail.  
Second, a diverse set of controllers have been selected within each module that results in 
several advantages over a non-diverse set. It is expected that unintentional design flaws 
with a controller by one manufacturer should not be presented in a different manufacturer’s 
controller. A common example of such a design flaw is the Pentium FDIV bug [41]. As 
well, different software, programming tools and compilers are needed that can potentially 
reduce systemic design flaws. Further, it has been determined experimentally that different 




example, different controller technology will have a different apparent activation energy 
that results in altered performance at low vs high temperatures. Additionally, different 
wireless chips are more susceptible to low ionizing radiation dose rates whereas others are 
more susceptible to high dose rates [42]. Therefore, the selection of diverse components 
can result in non-overlapping failure mechanisms to reduce the impact of CCFs in a design.  
5.1.2 Circuit Simulations 
Prior to constructing hardware, key circuit structures have been simulated to verify their 
design. Three electronic circuit functions have been selected for simulation:  
1) 4-20mA to 0-2.4V sensor interface. 
2) RF filtering/matching circuit. 
3) Fault detection hardware. 
Simulations for the sensor interface and the RF circuit have been completed using 
LTSPICE, a free electronic circuit simulator developed by Linear Technology. The fault 
detection hardware simulation has been completed using PSPICE, a similar circuit 
simulator developed by Cadence. The details for these simulations are presented next. 
5.1.2.1 Sensor Interface Simulation 
The sensor interface is required to convert a 4-20mA industrial sensor signal into a voltage 
for each MCU’s analog to digital converter (ADC). The minimum input voltage for one of 
the selected MCU’s is 2.4V. To prevent component damage, a 20mA signal should yield a 
voltage of 2.4V to each ADC’s input. 
An operational amplifier has been selected to convert the sensor’s current signal into an 
appropriately scaled voltage. The schematic for the sensor interface is shown in Figure 5.1. 
The results of the simulation can be seen in Figure 5.2. Note that a low sampling frequency 
has been selected that simplifies the sensor interface design since WSNs typically do not 





Figure 5.1: Sensor interface schematic. 
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5.1.2.2 RF Filtering Simulation 
Module B’s WMCUs are capable of operating across a wide range of sub-GHz radio 
frequencies. A RF filter is therefore required to ensure that the radios operates within the 
500MHz band. Manufacturer suggested RF filter’s and matching circuits have been used 
as the base circuit design and tuned for the 500MHz band. Figure 5.3 to Figure 5.6 show 
the schematics and the simulation results for the CC1310 and the EZR32LG WMCU.  
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For both sets of simulations, the maximum gain occurs at around 580MHz rather than the 
desired 490MHz center frequency in the selected 500MHz band. It is expected that 
unmodelled conditions (such as input pin capacitances, trace impedances, and stray 
capacitances) will center the signal closer to 490MHz. Therefore, during the PCB 
implementation of Module B, a spectrum analyzer has been used to confirm that that the 
bandpass signal is shifted closer to 490MHz.    
5.1.2.3 Fault Detection Hardware Simulation 
In the fault detection hardware simulation, the circuit is expected to detect and identify 
digital communication bus faults, such as encoding and ‘stuck-at’ faults. Although the 
schematic for this hardware has not been shown, one of the simulations results has be 
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;ac lin 1000 200mega 900mega
.ac lin 1000 200mega 1500mega
CC1310 TX 500 M HZ
CC1310 RX 500M Hz
EZR32 TX 500 M HZ
Figure 5.5: EZR32LG filtering schematic. (Left TX) (Right RX). 







































































is shown in the figure. A trip signal is sent after 1 byte of inactivity, or 8 digital pulses 
(blue line), for a digital line communicating at 100KHz using the I2C protocol. The trip 
signal then triggers a switch that drives current through a relay (red line).  
 
Figure 5.7: Circuit simulation depicting a trip signal for the fault detection 
hardware. 
5.1.3 PCB Modules 
The second step in the hardware implementation process is to develop the PCB prototypes 
for the proposed WSN system. This system consists of two dual-redundant modules, 
Module A and Module B. Module A has been selected to operate at 900MHz and comprises 
of the following components: the ATZB-X0 WMCU, the ATSAMR30 WMCU and the 
AT90CAN supervisory unit.  
A dual-redundant 4-20mA sensor interface has also been implemented, along with a dual-




Electromechanical relays have been used to reconfigure the device if faults are detected 
within the various components. The prototype for Module A is depicted in Figure 5.8. 
 
Figure 5.8: Module A PCB prototype. 
Module B has been selected to operate at 500MHz and comprises of the following 
components: the CC1310 WMCU, the EZR32LG WMCU and the LCP17 supervisory unit. 
The similar features to Module A have been included in Module B, and the prototype is 
depicted in Figure 5.9.  
 




A prototype for the modularized device has also been built. In the modular design prototype 
implementation, each module has been divided into several sub-modules. Module A has 
been divided into three sub-modules for its two WMCUs and the supervisory unit, A1, A2 
and S1 respectively. Similarly, Module B has been divided into three sub-modules for its 
two WMCUs and supervisory unit, B1, B2 and S2 respectively. These sets of sub-modules 
are shown in Figure 5.10 to Figure 5.12. 
 
Figure 5.10: Sub-modules A1 (left) and A2 (right). 
 





Figure 5.12: Sub-modules S1 (left) and S2 (right). 
The modular design’s auxiliary systems (such as the dual-redundant sensor interface and 
fault reconfiguration mechanisms) have been separated into two sub-modules, AUX1 and 
AUX 2. The auxiliary sub-modules are shown in Figure 5.13.  
 
Figure 5.13: Sub-modules AUX1 (left) and AUX2 (right).  
The proprietary fault detection hardware has also been separated into a sub-module, 





Figure 5.14: Proprietary fault detection hardware sub-module. 
The complete modular design is shown in  Figure 5.15. 
 
Figure 5.15: Modularized design. 
5.2 Software Implementation 
Software implementation includes the integration of an operating system (OS) across each 
embedded platform, the communication stack and the remote server for data-logging.  
The complete software stack for the developed WSN system is illustrated in Figure 5.16. 




hardware interactions. The second layer from the bottom is the embedded OS that is 
responsible for scheduling tasks, handling interrupts and managing the application. The 
third layer is the medium access control (MAC) protocol. The MAC protocol dictates the 
flow of data to and from a radio to ensure that the medium (wireless link) is accessed 
through some control scheme. The next layer is the network protocol which is responsible 
for dictating how data is routed through the network. The top layer is the application and 
is the location where the various test algorithms reside.  
 
Figure 5.16: Software stack for implementation. 
Above the embedded software stack is the Linux remote server driver and the ThingSpeak 
remote server. The Linux remote server driver interacts with the embedded software 
through the application layer and is responsible for pushing data to the ThingSpeak server 
for data logging. Each of these layers is discussed in more depth.     
                       
                        
                    
                
           
                          
             
          
     




5.2.1 Hardware Drivers 
To enable the correct software-hardware interactions on each embedded MCU, a set of 
hardware drivers is required. Table 5.2 identifies the hardware driver that have been 
developed, the MCUs that required the driver and the functionality provided by the driver. 
Table 5.2: Developed microcontroller drivers. 
Driver Target MCU Functionality 
ADC EZR32HG, EZR32LG, SAMR30, 
ATXMEGA, CC1310, AT90CAN, 
LPC17, Atmel 8051 
Analog to digital conversion for 
the 4-20mA sensor interface 
I2C EZR32HG, EZR32LG, SAMR30, 
ATXMEGA, CC1310, AT90CAN, 
LPC17, Atmel 8051 
General purpose bus 
communication (multi-master) 
SPI EZR32HG, EZR32LG, SAMR30, 
ATXMEGA, CC1310, AT90CAN, 
LPC17 
General purpose bus 
communication (multi-master) 
UART ATXMEGA, SAMR30 Peer-to-peer microcontroller 
interfacing 
TIMER EZR32HG, EZR32LG, SAMR30, 
ATXMEGA, CC1310, AT90CAN, 
LPC17, Atmel 8051 
Timer and task scheduling  
CAN 2.0B AT90CAN, LPC17 CAN bus driver for CAN 
transceiver module 
Each MCU required drivers for their ADCs, buses (I2C and SPI) and timers. Only the 
supervisor units required the CAN 2.0B driver. Only the ATXMEGA and the ATSAMR30 
adopted the universal asynchronous receiver-transmitter as an added communication 
channel during early prototyping. These drivers represent the lowest layer of the software 
stack in Figure 5.16. 
5.2.2 Operating System Porting 
As noted previously, there are several challenges that arise when working with a diverse 
set of MCUs. After evaluating several OSs suitable for WSN devices, RIOT OS has been 
selected [43].  
Table 5.3 summarizes some of the effort required to port RIOT OS for 8 different MCUs. 
Note that RIOT OS could not be ported for the uC8051 architecture, since the CPU core’s 




Table 5.3: Summary of porting requirements for RIOT OS. 
Microcontroller Architecture Port Compiler Port 
ATXMEGA Redefine CPU Registers and CPU 
Stack Calls. Interrupt Calls 
GNU Supported 
CC1310 Direct Support LTS Compiler Port - remove atomic 
calls, alter data type definition, change 
assembly calls 
ATSAMR30 Adaption of the ATSAMR20 GNU Supported 
EZR32HG Adaptation of the EZR32HG Arm-gcc Port - minor changes to 
header support calls, assembly calls 
EZR32LG Adaptation of the EZR32HG Arm-gcc Port - minor changes to 
header support calls, assembly calls 
AT90CAN Adaption of the Atmega1281 GNU Supported 
LPC17 Direct Support Arm-gcc Port - minor changes to 
header support calls, assembly calls 
uC8051 Incompatible - CPU stack does not 
support 
Incompatible - C51 compiler does not 
support assembly use 
5.2.3 MAC and Network Layers 
The next stack layers in Figure 5.16 is the MAC protocol layer and the Network layer. The 
IEEE 802.15.4 protocol has been chosen as the primary MAC protocol for use due to its 
wide adoption in industry. Due to the complexity and strict timing of the IEEE 802.15.4 
standard, manufacturers provide their own custom implementations for their products. The 
MAC protocol and its respective drivers are integrated with the Real Time Operating 
System stack layer through various interfacing points in the software. These interfacing 
points are the radio driver function calls and callback functions.  
A second MAC protocol has been developed for the implementation and used with Module 
B. The reasoning for this alternate MAC protocol implementation is to demonstrate that 
the proposed system need not be tied to the IEEE 802.15.4 protocol. By using manufacturer 
provided radio drivers, the second MAC protocol can be linked into the OS in a similar 
way described above.  
The next layer in the software stack is the network protocol. The network protocol is 
responsible for routing data from end to end in the network. Since the network protocol is 





5.2.4 Application Layer 
The application layer of the software distinguishes devices from one another. A device 
either acts as a field device, a router or a gateway in the network. Field devices poll their 
ADC for sensor data, format the information into a packet and then send this packet towards 
the gateway device. Router devices act as intermediate devices between the field devices 
and the gateway. These devices only re-transmit received data in the direction of the 
gateway. The gateway device acts as the network sink, aggregating the received data and 
passing it to an external network. In this application, the external network is the 
ThingSpeak remote server. The gateway devices communicate externally to a computer 
that then connects to the remote server through an Internet connection. Note that the 
application layer also houses the microcontroller-based BIT and the supervisory diagnostic 
algorithm.  
5.2.5 Remote Server Integration 
The final software layers are the Linux drivers and the ThingSpeak remote server. 
ThingSpeak is a free platform for IoT data collection, data processing and action control. 
Using the HTTP, devices with an Internet connection can push and poll data to/from the 
ThinkSpeak’s server. The purpose of the server in this application is to demonstrate the 
capabilities for the proposed system to interface with an external network and log data.  
A computer acts as an intermediate device between a gateway’s application layer and the 
ThingSpeak server. A Python script on the computer acts as the ThingSpeak driver, 
formatting the collected data and then pushing it the ThingSpeak server over HTTP.  
5.3 Implementation Summary 
The implementation phase consisted of two core tasks. First, the hardware for the WSN 
has been implemented. This process included the diverse component selection, circuit 
simulations and the PCB design. The selection of the diverse components and the 
supervisory unit satisfied the failure rate requirements from the analysis in Chapter 3. After, 
the software for the WSN has been implemented to allow for the devices to operate as a 




protocols, a network protocol, and gateway interfacing capabilities to the ThingSpeak 




Chapter 6  
6 Redundancy Management System Evaluation 
The evaluation of the prototype WSN device has been done using a three-fold process. 
First, to better understand the reliability improvement gained through the proposed 
redundancy management system, a comparative analysis is performed against existing 
commercial WSN products. Next, fault injection testing is used to demonstrate the 
proposed system’s fault-tolerance. This testing shows how fault coverage is improved by 
the supervisory unit and fault detection hardware, while also showing how CCFs can be 
reduced through the modularized and diverse system. Finally, several experimental test 
cases are used to demonstrate the WSN’s ability to perform industrial monitoring in an 
experimental setting. These evaluations have demonstrated the effectiveness of the 
proposed redundancy management system.  
6.1 Reliability Analysis 
The first evaluation method for the redundancy management system is reliability analysis. 
Using the analysis from Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, a model can be developed for a one-
module device and a two-module device. For this evaluation, averaged manufacturer 
failure rate data has been used to represent the component failure rates. Two scaling factors 
modify the failure rates for harsh industrial environments. First, MIL-HDBK-217 has 
scaled the component failure rates to an ambient temperature of 105oC and 165oC. These 
temperatures are selected based on estimated temperature in a NPP during an accident 
condition [44]. The second scaling term is for the radiation degradation factor that results 
under 10Krads of ionizing radiation, chosen based on the same previous accident scenario. 
Note that 10Krads has been chosen since some WMCUs can only withstand about 20-
30Krads TID [45]. The environmental conditions from [44] are shown in Table 6.1. A 






Table 6.1: Environment within a NPP during normal (N) and accident (A) 
conditions. 




Control Building (N) 15-40 < 0.2 
Auxiliary Building (N) 1-40 0.01 - 1000 
Auxiliary Building (A) 40-160 0.01 - 1000 
Loop Compartment (N) 15-40 6000 
Loop Compartment (A) 120 - 200 8000 









(105oC)   
Scaling Factor 
AF 






LiPo Battery* 10000 Not Available Not Available Not Available 
Power Converter* 20000 5.0 47.7 0.1408 
Wireless 
Microcontroller** 
1.48 5.0 47.7 0.1026 
Supervisory 
Microcontroller** 
1.22 5.0 47.7 0.0638 
Sensor Interface* 20000 5.0 47.7 0.2377 
RF Circuitry* 5000 27.6 64.4 0 
Digital Bus* 20000 5.0 47.7 0.133 
*FIT estimated using MIL-HDBK-217F 
**FIT derived from chip manufacturer 
To evaluate the performance of the developed devices, a comparative analysis against two 
existing WSN platforms, the IRIS mote [46] and the Meshlium Gateway [47], has been 
performed. These two systems are assumed to contain the same major device components 
and failure rates as the proposed WSN device. Note that the IRIS mote is a simple, non-
redundant system whereas the Meshlium gateway incorporates redundancy. As well, it has 
been assumed that a BIT-based redundancy management system exists within the 
Meshlium gateway that does not have the proposed supervisory unit or fault detection 





Figure 6.1: IRIS mote (left) and the Meshlium gateway (right) device. 
The final parameters required for reliability modelling is the fault coverage, 𝑐, and the 
CCF’s 𝛽-factor at each layer of the design. Without experimental data, accurate estimates 
for these parameters can be challenging. Rather than arbitrarily selecting values, an 
optimistic evaluation of the proposed system has been done. Here, the fault coverage level, 
𝑐, is assumed to be one and the 𝛽-factors are assumed to be zero for each of the analyzed 
devices, when applicable. That is to say, the system has perfect fault coverage and no CCF 
mechanisms introduced into the design. Although these model parameters are unrealistic, 
all three systems are being evaluated under the same assumed conditions.  
Under these assumptions for the model parameters, Figure 6.2 (for 105oC) and Figure 6.3 
(for 165oC) show the reliability for four devices: the IRIS mote, the Meshlium gateway, a 
one-module device, and the two-module device. Note that for the latter two, each module 





Figure 6.2: Reliability comparison for different devices under elevated 
environmental conditions (105oC). 
 
Figure 6.3: Reliability comparison for different devices under elevated 
environmental conditions (165oC). 
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From these figures, it is clear that both one-module and two-module devices can provide a 
MTTF improvement over the commercially available ones. This result is anticipated since 
the proposed system incorporates redundancy within each module and between the two 
modules. Nevertheless, this result shows how the proposed topology can improve system 
reliability, making it better suited for deployment in harsh environments. Furthermore, 
these two figures also clearly demonstrate the impact of harsh environment on system 
reliability. 
6.2 Fault Injection Testing 
The second method for evaluating the developed WSN devices is fault injection testing 
[48]. Here, a set of controlled tests are performed on both one-module and two-module 
devices to determine whether the systems can tolerate the faults. In these tests, faults are 
either emulated within each module through software or are physically injected. Figure 6.4 
illustrate these two fault injection methods. 
 
Figure 6.4: Method for injecting faults into a device. 
Multiple fault injection tests have been performed on Module A, Module B and their 




which is then transmitted through any of the module’s radios, as shown in Figure 6.5. 
Depending on the specific faults injected, it is expected that a one-module device will fail, 
whereas the two-module device should operate successfully.  
 
Figure 6.5: Fault injection test scenario. 
Two rounds of fault injection testing have been performed, the first to investigate the fault 
coverage improvement, and the second is to evaluate the CCF reduction. For the first round, 
the injected faults and the detection location (either the BIT, the supervisory diagnostic 
algorithm or the fault detection hardware) are shown in Table 6.3.  
As shown in Table 6.3, the microcontroller BIT can detect four of the injected faults. Faults, 
such as out-of-bounds outputs (test #1.4) and deadlock/livelock situations (test #1.2 and 
test #1.3 respectively) can also be detected by standard software-based BITs. However, 
certain faults can only be detected by the supervisory diagnostic algorithm or the fault 
detection hardware, which has demonstrated the superiority of the proposed design. As 
shown in the table, in test #1.5, digital line noise has been injected into one of the device’s 
redundant WMCUs that caused its output value to be changed. The supervisory diagnostic 
algorithm has detected a mismatched output between the dual-redundant WMCUs and has 




intended output value with the received one and has identified that a fault has been induced 
by digital line noise. A similar process has occurred in test #1.6, and the supervisory 
diagnostic algorithm has been able to help detect the fault successfully. 
The fault detection hardware has also contributed to the improvement of fault detection in 
a device. The stuck-at faults in test #1.8 and test #1.9 caused a digital communication line 
to become unusable. Within a single module, three components share each digital 
communication line, preventing BITs from identifying the source of the fault (any 
component could have caused the fault). The additional fault detection hardware has been 
designed to identify the source of these types of digital communication faults, and therefore 
contributes to an improved fault coverage.  
Note that the proposed WSN device can still suffer from external faults. For example, if 
the sensor inputs faulty data (test #1.5), it cannot be detected by the proposed system. This 
can be handled separately, but handling sensor faults are out of the scope of this work. 
In a non-redundant WSN devices (such as the IRIS mote in the previous analysis), it is 
reasonable to assume that the faults in Table 6.3 could not be detected and recovered from 
as they do not employ a redundancy management system. To contrast, existing redundant 
WSN devices (such as the Meshlium gateway) might be able to detect faults that are 
detected by the microcontroller BIT. However, standard redundant systems that use BITs 
cannot detect and recover from the faults that are covered only by the supervisory 
diagnostic algorithm or by the fault detection hardware (see Table 6.3).  
These tests have demonstrated that additional faults can be detected, and hence, a device’s 
fault coverage can be improved by the proposed system. To determine the exact fault 
coverage improvement, exhaustive testing has to be done, which is beyond the scope of 







Table 6.3: Results of the fault coverage fault injection tests. 
Test 
# 











1.1 WMCU Memory Corruption X    
1.2 Deadlock X    
1.3 Livelock X    
1.4 Out-of-Bounds Output X    
1.5 Sensor Input Fault    X 
1.6 Digital Line Noise  X   
1.7 Latched Digital Output Register  X   
1.8 Digital Line ‘Stuck-at’ Fault Low   X  
1.9 Digital Line ‘Stuck-at’ Fault High   X  
1.10 Digital Line Encoding Fault   X  
 Totals 4 2 3 1 
The second round of fault injection testing has been done to evaluate the impact of CCF 
mechanisms in the proposed WSN device. To demonstrate that, faults have been injected 
into one-module devices and a two-module device, and the fault-tolerance performance has 
been compared, as shown in Table 6.4.  Faults have been injected into each module and 
into the redundant/diverse sub-systems (i.e., the dual-redundant bus and dual-redundant 
sensor interface). In Table 6.4, WMCU A1 Fault represents a complete failure of the 
module A’s first redundant wireless microcontroller. If the device is able to complete the 
test scenario previously described (acquire dummy data and then send the data through a 
radio), then the result of that test is a success and is shown as a ‘pass’ in the table. 
Conversely, if the device is unable to complete the test scenario, then the result of that test 
is shown as a ‘fail’. Note that in the table, some tests may not be applicable for certain 
devices, which are indicated as N/A. 
It can be seen from Table 6.4 that the redundant design has reduced certain single points 
of failures in the device. Each device has a redundant sensor interface and a redundant 
digital bus. A single fault in either of these (test #2.16 to test #2.19) have not caused the 





Table 6.4: Results of the CCF fault injection tests. 
Test 
# 







2.1 WMCU A1 Fault PASS N/A PASS 
2.2 WMCU A2 Fault PASS N/A PASS 
2.3 WMCU B1 Fault N/A PASS PASS 
2.4 WMCU B2 Fault N/A PASS PASS 
2.5 WMCU A1+A2 Fault FAIL N/A PASS 
2.6 WMCU B1+B2 Fault N/A FAIL PASS 
2.7 WMCU A1+A2+B1 Fault N/A N/A PASS 
2.8 WMCU A1+A2+B2 Fault N/A N/A PASS 
2.9 WMCU B1+B2+A1 Fault N/A N/A PASS 
2.10 WMCU B1+B2+A2 Fault N/A N/A PASS 
2.11 Supervisory S1 Fault PASS N/A PASS 
2.12 Supervisory S2 Fault N/A PASS PASS 
2.13 Supervisory S1+S2 Fault N/A N/A PASS 
2.14 900MHz Channel Blocking FAIL PASS PASS 
2.15 500MHz Channel Blocking PASS FAIL PASS 
2.16 Sensor Interface S1 Fault PASS PASS PASS 
2.17 Sensor Interface S2 Fault PASS PASS PASS 
2.18 Digital Bus D1 Fault PASS PASS PASS 
2.19 Digital Bus D2 Fault PASS PASS PASS 
 Totals (Passed) 8 8 19 
In certain scenarios, the effect of CCFs have only been mitigated by the diverse, modular 
design. For example, in test #2.1 and test #2.2, module A (and therefore module A+B) has 
continued to work when any one of module A’s WMCU has suffered from a fault (this is 
expected since each module has dual-redundant WMCUs). However, when both WMCUs 
within a single module have failed (test #2.5 and test #2.6) only the two-module device has 
continued to work. This is because, as designed, the modular device can work if any one 
of its modules are operational. Further, the two-module device has continued to work when 
only one WMCU (from four WMCUs from module A and B) has been operational (test # 
2.7 to test # 2.10). Moreover, partial channel blocking, such as the 900MHz channel 
blocking and the 500MHz channel blocking in test #2.14 and test #2.15 respectively, has 
been mitigated by the diverse, two-module device. 
The fail-safe nature of the supervisory unit has also been demonstrated. The one-module 
and two-module devices has continued to operate even when the supervisory unit has 




In summary, in the proposed design, each dual-redundant module has a supervisory unit, 
fault detection hardware and reconfiguration mechanisms. If a CCF mechanism causes one 
module to fail, the second module in the modularized design does not necessarily fail since 
the redundancy management system has also been modularized. Existing WSN devices 
might not have this partially-modularized redundancy management system. Therefore, it 
would be expected that any failure in their redundancy management system would 
constitute a device failure.  
6.3 WSN Experimental Test Scenarios 
The third evaluation method verifies that the developed devices can effectively perform 
industrial WSN monitoring tasks. To do this, the Nuclear Plant Control Test Facility 
(NPCTF) has been selected as the test platform. The NPCTF is a physical system that 
emulates the main process loops of a CANDU-style nuclear power plant. As such, this 
system has an abundant of process variables that can be accessed for monitoring and 
control purposes. Figure 6.6 shows the NPCTF system. For this evaluation, the main loop 
pressure, denoted as P1, has been selected for monitoring.  
 
Figure 6.6: Nuclear Plant Control Test Facility. 
Two test scenarios have been selected. The first test has utilized one-module devices to 
measure P1, and then relay this information to a gateway device connected to a remote 




6.3.1 Test Scenario #1: One-Module Data Trending 
The first test scenario demonstrates that a one-module device can be used to create a WSN 
system that can collect industrial process data. By relaying information from a field device 
to a gateway device, the developed devices can clearly operate together to form a WSN 
system. Figure 6.7 and Figure 6.8 show the experimental setup for the three devices using 
the NPCTF system. 
 
Figure 6.7: A one-module device interfaced to the NPCTF. 
 
Figure 6.8: Test scenario #1 setup. 
In this test, the field device has been programmed to poll the sensor interface on 20 second 
intervals for approximately 37 minutes. After each interval, the P1 value has been 
forwarded to the gateway device and then uploaded to the ThingSpeak server. The results 






Figure 6.9: Test scenario #1 ThingSpeak server results.  
The results of the test show that the one-module devices achieved an event loss rate of 
1.81% and was successfully able to trend the recorded pressure sensor data. The success of 
this first test affirms that a one-module device can perform a general industrial WSN 
monitoring task.   
Table 6.5: Event loss rate results for test scenario #1. 
Events Sent Events Received Events Lost Event Loss Rate 
112 110 2 1.81% 
6.3.2 Test Scenario #2: Two-Module Data Trending 
The second test scenario uses a two-module device to complete the described monitoring 





Figure 6.10: Interfacing of the two-module device. 
The experimental setup using the NPCTF is shown in Figure 6.11. Similar to the previous 
test scenario, these devices have been programmed to relay process information to the 
gateway devices on 20 second intervals. This test ran for approximately 6 hours over a 
three-day span. The results of this test are shown in Figure 6.12 and Table 6.6. 
 






Figure 6.12: Test scenario #2 ThingSpeak server results. 
The results of the second test scenario show an improvement in the event loss rate for the 
two-module devices to 0.09%. This improvement is expected since both the 900MHz 
module and the 500MHz module can operate simultaneously. 
Table 6.6: Event loss rate results for test #2. 
Events Sent Events Received Events Lost Event Loss Rate 
1093 1092 1 0.09% 
Both test scenarios have been successful; information has been relayed from the field 
device to the gateway device, and then uploaded to the remote server. This success 
concludes the demonstration of the WSN as a general industrial monitoring solution.  
6.4 Evaluation Summary 
The results of the three evaluation methods have shown the fault-tolerant capabilities of 
the proposed redundancy management system. First, the comparative reliability analysis of 
the proposed WSN system has shown to increase reliability against existing commercial 
devices. Next, the improvement to fault coverage and the reduction in CCF mechanisms 
has been shown by the fault injection tests. Finally, the WSN’s ability to complete a general 




core requirements. Overall, the evaluation has demonstrated the proposed redundancy 





Chapter 7  
7 Conclusions 
In this chapter, this work has been summarized and concluded, along with a list of 
contributions. 
7.1 Summary 
To understand the reliability performance of redundant systems using BITs, first, a 
redundancy-relevance boundary has been developed that can be used to identify the 
minimum fault coverage level to justify a redundant design. This boundary has then been 
extended to include the impact of CCFs. A reliability-improvement plane has also been 
developed to determine the reliability improvement gained from a specific design. The 
redundancy-relevance boundary and the reliability-improvement plane have been shown 
to be a useful tool when analyzing whether a redundant design can potentially improve a 
system’s reliability. 
Next, a redundancy management system topology has been proposed that uses a 
supervisory unit to improve fault detection. By improving the fault detection capabilities 
for each BIT, an overall fault coverage improvement can be achieved. This topology has 
been extended to form a modularized system design that can help to alleviate the impact of 
CCFs. A redundancy management system has then been designed based on the proposed 
topology and implemented in a prototype WSN system.  
Through reliability analysis and fault injection testing, it has been shown that the proposed 
system can effectively alleviate the impact of both imperfect fault coverage and CCFs. The 
suitability of the proposed WSN system under an industrial deployment has also been 
demonstrated. In summary, the proposed design can be implemented in fault-tolerant WSN 
devices to make WSNs more robust to withstand harsh environments.   
7.2 Contributions 




• A reliability-relevance boundary and a reliability-improvement plane has been 
developed as a tool to aid in assessing the reliability of a redundant design.  
• A redundancy management system topology has been proposed that uses a 
supervisory unit to improve fault coverage in a BIT-based design. 
• The proposed redundancy management system topology has been extended to form 
a modularized system design that can help to alleviate the impact of CCFs. 
• Fault detection hardware has been developed for digital communication buses, such 
as I2C, that can improve fault coverage.   
• The proposed design has been implemented in prototype WSN devices, and the 
fault-tolerant performance of the devices has been evaluated. 
7.3 Conclusions 
A WSN system, when deployed under harsh environment to accomplish a mission, may 
experience higher rate of component failure, leading the system to fail prematurely. Fault-
tolerant design based on redundancy can enhance the performance of a WSN system under 
such deployments. However, overall system performance improvement can be 
compromised due to factors such as imperfect fault coverage and CCFs. The BIT-based 
approach for redundancy management suffers from both factors. A BIT-based redundant 
WSN system has been designed, developed and investigated that makes use of a 
supervisory unit and a modular architecture to address the issues associated with imperfect 
fault coverage and CCFs. Based on the evaluation results, it may be concluded that the 
combination of a supervisory unit and modular design can potentially alleviate the impact 
of both imperfect fault coverage and CCFs on a redundant WSN design, which may to lead 
to higher system reliability and fault-tolerance. 
7.4 Suggestions for Future Work 
To improve upon the existing work, three suggestions are provided to help guide future 




• Evaluate the reliability model developed in Chapter 3 for the supervisory unit 
using advanced modelling or experimental testing. 
• Complete exhaustive fault injection testing to determine the supervisory unit’s 
fault coverage improvement. 
• Evaluate the impact of false-positives caused by the redundancy management 
system on a device’s reliability. 
The reliability model in Chapter 3 (Equation 3.14) used the coverage decay function to 
bound the reliability of the proposed redundancy management system. It is not known 
whether this model accurately reflects the reliability of the system. However, its accuracy 
could be determined by using more advanced modelling techniques (such as dynamic fault 
tree analysis) or by completing experimental testing.  
It has been shown that the proposed redundancy management system can improve fault 
coverage, but the magnitude of the improvement is not yet known. Ultimately, the value of 
the redundancy management system hinges on the fault coverage improvement. 
Throughout the analysis of the redundancy management system, it has been assumed that 
false-positives provided by the supervisory unit can be correctly discerned by each 
redundant component’s BIT. Since the supervisory unit is only providing feedback to each 
BIT in the proposed design, this assumption might be valid. However, more responsibilities 
and decision making could be given to the supervisory unit to further improve fault 
coverage. If this is the case, false-positives could be a prominent issue. Further, each BIT 
is also susceptible to false-positives. The impact of false-positives from all elements of the 
proposed redundancy management should be investigated to conclude how effective the 
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